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Report Title
Corruption Prevention in Ontario Municipalities

Question
‘Are government actions sufficient to reduce and eventually eliminate corruption
and preserve integrity within Ontario Municipalities?’

Abstract
“Over the last decade, a vast amount of academic as well as policysupport

research

has

been

conducted on

integrity,

transparency and

accountability – and conversely – corruption in the public sector… A consensus
has developed world-wide over the importance of reforming public sector
institutions to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and to prevent
and combat corruption. Such reforms are crucial to protecting public resources,
enhancing public sector performance, and strengthening the government’s role in
orchestrating development and providing basic services.” (Ashour, 2004)
The main objective of this paper is to determine if the government, both
provincial and municipal, are doing enough to prevent and eventually eliminate
corruption and maintain integrity at the municipal level. The determination is
particularly important as Canadians municipalities, should be ‘seen as neutral,
non-partisan, effective and innovative institutions that serve the best interests of
the government and the citizens…’ (Langford, 1987).
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INTRODUCTION
“Throughout history political and government figures have used their
position to profit from bribes and kickbacks.” (Gerassi, 1980) “The use of political
office for economic [and personal] gain is tempting…[and] powerful politicians
have been implicated in corrupt practices…Individuals in important positions sell
their power, influence and information…such as government employees taking
kickbacks from contractors in return for awarding them contracts.” (McCormick,
2010).

These statements certainly attest to Leslie Pal’s evaluation of the

operations of government, when he stated that “there is already a pervasive
mood of cynicism and distrust of government. Bad news concerning government
operations is easily… seen as evidence of corruption, incompetence and
malfeasance.” (Pal, 2003).
Doug Ford of the City of Toronto as he ran for election as councillor in the
2010 municipal election said, “The system at City Hall is broken. There is a
culture of corruption down there and we’re going to put an end to it… If this was
in the States, they’d be in front of a grand jury and they’d be in jail right now”
(Jenkins, 2010)

This was a very strong statement and was supported by the

Mayoral Candidate at the time Rob Ford when he said, “I wish I could tell you the
stuff that happens behind closed doors.” These statements sent an implicative
message that corrupt activities continued at the City of Toronto.
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“Over the last decade, a vast amount of academic as well as policysupport

research

has

been

conducted on

integrity,

transparency and

accountability – and conversely – corruption in the public sector… A consensus
has developed world-wide over the importance of reforming public sector
institutions to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and to prevent
and combat corruption. Such reforms are crucial to protecting public resources,
enhancing public sector performance, and strengthening the government’s role in
orchestrating development and providing basic services.” (Ashour, 2004)
With the amendment of the Municipal Act, 2001 through the Municipal
Statute Law Amendment Act, the Ontario government’s intention is primarily to
promote transparency and accountability within municipal operations and its
awareness among the public.

The public is now able to participate in ensuring

accountability and transparency and is directed by the Public Complaints
guidelines. A pertinent question is, ‘How informed is the public about the public
complaints guidelines?’
“Accountability is the degree to which local governments have to explain
or justify what they have done or failed to do. It can be seen as the validation of
participation, to which [the public] can hold a local government responsible for its
actions…In theory, transparency in local governance should mean less scope for
corruption, in that dishonest behaviour would become more easily detectable,
punished and discouraged in future” (Decentralization Team, World Bank, 2008)
The team also revealed that there exists an association between transparency
and corruption, wherein, an ‘increase in the level of transparency in local
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governance was not necessarily accompanied by increased corruption’. It was
further noted that the ‘increase in the level of transparency did however lead to
popular perceptions of greater public malfeasance, simply because citizens
became more aware of what was going on, a pattern that continues to repeat
itself in many other locales.’ Ontario Canada is by no means excluded from this
perception by the public, where the media plays an integral role in the increased
awareness.
I have chosen to examine this issue of corruption prevention in Ontario
municipalities in an attempt to determine if government is doing enough to
prevent and eliminate corruption and maintain integrity within Ontario
municipalities. Some would argue that the answer is very clear, but I believe
taking another look at the issue is worth a try. I believe I am embarking on a very
sensitive issue, but one that is real and exists. It is an issue where the municipal
staff that are involved in the corrupt activity go unreported, ignored too often and
is not easily talked about in public.

The issue of corruption and prevention is

usually associated with third world and developing countries, where measures
are continuously reviewed to ensure that the problem is addressed on an
ongoing basis. The province of Ontario along with the municipalities needs to be
reminded that despite being located within a developed country, corrupt activities
takes place right in our ‘backyards’.
My interpretation or view of corruption and its prevention in Ontario
municipalities is analogous to our annual road repairs during the spring and
summer.

This comparison is in direct reference to a recent sink hole that
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developed in a major intersection in London Ontario, where the problem was
confirmed to be caused by a leaking water main that was slowly eroding the
earth below the road. The indicator that a serious problem was looming was a
broken section of the road that had partially swallowed a motor vehicle.
Corruption, is similar to that two-foot crack in the asphalt of a major intersection (municipality) and over the years at spring time, the crack is filled or patched with
new asphalt - (the corrective measures), without the workers - (legislators) really
trying to identify the source – (corrupt activities) of the crack (corruption), rather
than assuming that it is as a result of a long and cold winter (e.g. weak
legislation).

The patching continues until after a night of continuous rain, a

massive sink hole - (crisis) appears, taking the place of the previous crack in the
major intersection (municipality).

My thoughts are very similar to how corruption

prevention is handled in Ontario municipalities - Sort of muddling through,
wherein the corrective and preventive measures appear to be arbitrarily created
and implemented with the hopes that they will work or appear to work.
Government is a trust created for the benefit of the people. Elected officials
acknowledge that “members of the public expect elected officials to be guided by
the highest ethical standards of behavior in decision making and conduct.”
(Council, 2011) To ensure that the ‘trustees’ of government act in the benefit of
the people, legislation was and continues to be enacted and amended to direct
and guide the administration of municipal management. The general objective is
to enhance municipal performance, protect the public resources and strengthen
the government’s ability in providing its services. However, despite the legislative
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directives of the Municipal Act, 2001, giving municipalities the authority to appoint
an integrity commissioner and to provide education, advice and a complaints
investigation services, many Ontario municipalities to date have not adhered to
all the requirements. Sourced from a research conducted by a cross
departmental team from the Corporation of the City of Brampton, it was revealed
that of the 445 Ontario municipalities, less than 10 have established Codes of
Conduct and an Integrity Commissioner.” (Council, 2011) For the few
municipalities that have adhered to some aspects of the legislation, some did so
after encountering allegations of incidents of corruption, the most prominent
municipalities being the City of Toronto and Mississauga.

It must be

emphasized that corruption is not unique to any level of government and is
usually carried out by a very small percentage of both hired and elected staff. It is
never a good position for government to be in at any point in time.
Corruption prevention in Ontario municipalities is the responsibility of the
province, municipality, staff, law enforcers and the citizens. It is a collective
responsibility to ensure that municipalities are operated in a manner that does
not involve or support corrupt activities and where integrity and trust are highly
regarded. Kathleen Sebelius states that, “The essence of good government is
trust”. Louis D. Brandeis’ theory aptly endorses the statement by expressing that
“Our government... teaches the whole people by its example. If the government
becomes the lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy”. Therefore, how government is set
up and managed is critical in how integrity is seen by both the public and staff.
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Therefore, ongoing improvement and reform in the way local government works,
is so important in maintaining trust.
The next question to examine is, ‘how does government address an issue
and reform a system when there is little to no data to know where we are, where
we are coming from so we can know where we want to be?’ How can Ontario
municipalities argue whether or not corruption is out of control? Surveys provide
a proficient way of measuring the level of corruption within municipalities. A
survey on municipal corruption would attempt to capture the amount and dates of
occurrences, the types of occurrences, the position of the wrong doer, whether
the wrongdoer was criminally charged or not, the identity of the municipality,
whether the municipality has an appointed integrity commissioner and whether
the municipality has corruption preventative measures in place. In my attempts
to acquire reliable data, I requested the information via email from Statistics
Canada. The email response from Statistics Canada informed me that data on
the occurrences or incidents of corruption within municipalities were not collected
by the organization. This lack of reliable or statistically significant data will have a
negative impact on how justification will be ascertained regarding the number of
incidents or allegation of incidents. If the facts are not available to facilitate
comparisons, to conduct analysis and eventually make recommendations for
improvement in the prevention of corruption; how will the province know for sure
if the legislations enacted is being effective and if they are positively impacting
the occurrences by reducing them? The non-availability of a reliable database of
empirical data has also limited my ability to look at any possible trend of incidents
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over the years; hence I will look at the City of Toronto Bellamy Report as a case
study in an attempt to answer the questions.
While I am evaluating corruption and its prevention, I will also review the
definition of corruption, what causes it, where it occurs, what it involves and its
effects. This is important as I believe not being informed of the facts can also be
pointed out as a starting point for corrupt activities within municipalities. That is,
if a staff member is not aware that ordering stationery through the city purchasing
department and taking it home for their personal business is a corrupt activity,
then it will continue at the expense of the tax-paying public and could develop
into something more destructive.

I will also look at the various laws enacted to

address the corruption issue through their directives and promotion of
transparency, accountability and integrity within municipal operations, and
attempt to determine their effectiveness in getting the job done.
Government, through the reporting of allegations of corruption incidents is
aware that corruption exists and that it is not unique to any particular level.
Legislation is being enacted over time in an attempt to address the issue and
creating more legislation is not necessarily the most effective way of making the
situation better. Rochefort and Cobb in their theoretical approach to problem
solving, states it well, “Through the accumulation of information, a troubling social
condition comes to light and is documented. Next it is the job of public officials to
assess that problem and its causes and to respond as efficiently as possible
through such means as new legislative enactments. Attention continues until the
distressing concern is alleviated.” (Pal, 2003) But, is this really the intention of
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the upper levels of government in response to the apparent rise in allegations of
corruption at the municipal level? The information required to be able to make
intelligent decisions on the issue is not readily available because it is not
necessarily collected in a dedicated database. The media reporting of corrupt
incidents within municipalities provides a fair idea that corrupt incidents continue
to occur. The Federal government in a reactive approach enacted the Public
Sector Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) in 2007, and updated the requirement
for municipalities to adopt policies in the Municipal Act, 2001 through the
Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act to assist in addressing the issue. I will
discuss in more detail later in the paper, how these Acts attempt to assist in the
prevention of corruption. I will look at what has been done by the province since
2007(the time of the enactment of the Acts), the City of Toronto and the public to
see whether they are collectively ‘continuing the prevention course and ensuring
the distressing concern is eliminated’? (Pal, 2003)
The main objective of this paper is to determine if the governments,
both provincial and municipal, are doing enough to prevent and eventually
eliminate corruption and maintain integrity at the municipal level.

The

determination is particularly important as Canadians municipalities, should be
‘seen as neutral, non-partisan, effective and innovative institutions that serve the
best interests of the government and the citizens…’ (Langford, 1987). Being
accountable, transparent and maintaining integrity within municipalities are major
steps towards achieving these attributes. The purpose of this evaluation is to
provide an understanding of corruption prevention within municipalities and to
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make known the reasons why preventative measures were put in place. It is
hoped that this evaluation will be beneficial to all government staff and the
general public, to increase their awareness and know how they can play an
integral role in curbing corruption and maintaining integrity in municipal
government.
Due to this rise in the media reported incidents and allegations of incidents
of corrupt activities at the municipal level, my challenge is to evaluate the findings
of the current preventative measures and arrive at a conclusion to be able to
answer the question.

This is to be achieved by examining the various

legislations that promotes transparency and accountability and determine the
effectiveness of the preventative measures that are in place to address the issue.
I will use Rochefort and Cobb’s theoretical approach to problem solving in
analysing the incidents and allegations of corruption that were publicly disclosed
relating to the City of Toronto scandal. While determining if enough is being
done to eliminate corruption and maintain integrity, I will identify lessons to be
learned, best practices and measures to prevent a recurrence of the incidents. I
also will suggest recommendations that should be seriously considered for
implementation to effectively address corruption and maintain integrity at the
municipal level of government.
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THE CITY OF TORONTO – BELLAMY INQUIRY
The City of Toronto is Canada's largest city, formed through the largest
amalgamation in Canada’s history in 1998 and now home to a population of
about 2.6 million people. With a budget larger than that of any other city in
Canada and bigger than those of most provinces, by any measure, Toronto is a
major economic and cultural engine for Ontario and Canada. Toronto's municipal
government is dedicated to delivering customer service excellence, creating a
transparent and accountable government and reducing the size and cost of
government.

Their efforts have been acknowledged with awards for quality,

innovation and efficiency in delivering public services. The City of Toronto
continues to strengthen the City's accountability and transparency through their
participation in performance measurement and reporting initiatives to identify
where they are doing well and where they need to improve.’

With that

introduction adapted from the City’s website, one would believe the province’s
dream of the ultimate municipality existed. On the contrary, the City of Toronto
has been recovering from over a decade of scandal and allegations of corruption
highlighted through the Bellamy Inquiry Report. The report can be viewed online
at

http://www.toronto.ca/inquiry/inquiry_site/report/index.html.

The

report

highlights the ‘worst practice’ examples in municipal procurement and clearly
demonstrated the need for transparency, accountability and neutrality in
decision-making at the municipal level. The findings of Madam Justice Bellamy,
the commissioner who conducted the two judicial inquiries:

the

Toronto

Computer Leasing Inquiry and the Toronto External Contracts Inquiry, painted a
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“searing picture of the city’s politicians, lobbyists and bureaucrats as wallowing in
a swamp of greed...” (Toronto Star, 2009)

The findings noted in the report

provides lessons in what should not be done as municipal staff and officials carry
out the daily administration of the municipality.
It may sound strange to say that the ‘scandal’ could not have happened to
a better municipality, but looking at the positive side; it turned out to be a good
learning experience for all Ontario municipalities. The opportunity to improve
how city services are delivered, how the limited resources are allocated and
essentially how the municipal operations are carried out on a daily basis, was
given precedence all because it took place at the City of Toronto.

Justice

Bellamy commented that other municipalities and other levels of government
could benefit or find useful the recommendations provided and identify where
their own organization could do things better. She stated that the principles that
emerged were applicable since government conducted essentially the same
business throughout Ontario. (p. 23)
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THE PROBLEM
“Through the accumulation of information, a troubling…condition comes to
light and is documented…” (Pal, 2003)

Noticed by one of the Toronto’s Councillors in a staff report were the few
words, ‘current technology lease provider’, it sparked his curiosity and he wanted
answers. He wanted answers because he was always concerned that “buried in
reports were one-line statements that would come back to lynch you...” (pp. 3334).

MFP Financial Services was identified as the ‘current technology lease

provider, and when questions arose in the media about MFP leases with the City
of Waterloo, the City of Toronto realized they too needed to conduct an
investigation. The City then requested a KPMG investigation on the MFP leases.
In June 2001, it was revealed through the investigation, that the 1999 council
approved $43 million lease with MFP had grown to more than $80 million. This
raised further red flags that brought to light the troubling conditions of influence,
incompetence, ambition, greed, secrets and lies that had taken place at the City
of Toronto. So what were these troubling conditions and why was the situation
concluded as such?

Wanda Liczyk, who will now refer to as WL, was the Treasurer and a key
decision-maker at the City of Toronto.

Over a number of years, WL had

developed an intimate relationship Michael Saunders, who we will refer to as MS,
a representative of American Management Systems, a Virginia based company.
WL at no time over the years disclosed that she had intimate relations with MS.
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WL was one of the three decision-makers on MS first business proposal, where
he won the contract through the tender process.

In another business proposal

MS along with another American IT consultant proposed a customized tax
management and collection system called TMACS.

WL being one of the

decision-makers and not surprisingly the contract was awarded to MS again.
What made the award of this contract more questionable was the fact that the
contract was not tendered.

The actions of WL by not declaring her relationship with MS, being present as
a decision maker at all awards and not tendering one of the contract, went
against the North York Code of Conducts of that time. The code stated that an
employee “never uses the position to secure an advantage or favours for self,
family of friends”

Justice Bellamy in her report stated that “WL clearly knew that

boundaries existed, even if she did not quite get where the

line should be

drawn.. She walked into conflicts of interest with her eyes wide open.” Not only
was WL in breach of that code she was blatantly and repeatedly engaging in
what some would consider being corrupt activities. Corruption, as defined by the
World Bank and Transparency International is “the misuse of public office for
private gain.” ( The World Bank, 1997) “This includes a public servant accepting,
soliciting or extorting a bribe as well as instances where no bribery occurs but
public office is still misused, such as through nepotism, patronage, theft of assets
and diversion of state revenue.” (The World Bank, 2008)

Added to this

definition, is a precondition for corruption, know as Conflict of Interest. This
occurs when a “public sector employee or official is being influenced by personal
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considerations… [she/he then] make decisions for the wrong reasons that result
in wrong consequences” (Ethics B.O. Transparency International, 2000). It is
without a doubt that WL actions fittingly fell within the definitions.
This conflict of interest continued and was identified through the ‘targeted
marketing’ strategies of MFP towards the influential individuals at the City of
Toronto. Irene Payne, the senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing of MFP
labelled Dash Domi as a ‘hunter’ and recruited him as the new sales
representative for MFP. IP’s objective was for DD to target WL and her staff by
providing incentives to keep the decisions in favour of MFP.

Although not

experienced in the leasing business, and a former hairdresser, DD displayed the
qualities that IP desired and also used his brother’s fame as influence.

He

managed to use his influence by offering ‘goods’ to WL in an attempt to gain her
favour as a key decision maker. DD broke through to WL by inviting her along
with Jim Andrew, WL’s staff, to a dinner dance to ‘rub shoulders’ with other sport
celebrities.

Over time WL accepted meals, hockey tickets and golf passes and

a trip by air on a chartered jet to Ottawa to watch a hockey game.
WL had fallen in to a similar trap that she had fallen in with MS.

Once again

Gifts were also

offered to JA and included trips to the Masters Golf tournament in Georgia,
meeting in England, lunches, dinners and so on. The Bellamy report stated that
‘JA accepting all his gifts was an obvious and troubling sign that he as a public
servant was for sale.’ What made the situation more troubling was that JA tried to
justify the acceptance of the gifts as an “opportunity to learn about the supplier’s
product”.

P a g e | 19

The general theory is that ‘corrupt staff lack self control and follow their
impulses without considering the consequences.” (Siegel, 2010) There are also
some staffs who possess a high degree of self control but due to the aggressive
need to satisfy their ego, they get involved with corrupt activities. In between the
staffs with low and high self control, there are some staff who get involved in
corrupt activities because the opportunity presents itself at a time of need. It is
clear that some hired staff and elected officials including WL and JA, who engage
in corrupt practices “convince themselves that their actions are not criminal
because the acts do not resemble street crimes” (Siegel, 2010).
It is also evident that the position that staff members holds, can also cause
them to disregard policies, regulations and legislations. WL using her position as
the city treasurer to award a contract without it being tendered was a blatant
disregard of City policies regarding tenders.

One would question why some

individuals in a position of trust, despite rules and regulations, still involve
themselves in corrupt activities. Is it a matter of greed, need or corporate culture?
A PricewaterhouseCoopers 2003 survey (Fraud and corruption in Local
Government, 2008) (See Appendix 1) revealed that the primary motivation for
staff to get involved in corrupt activities is Greed. Greed that takes the form of;
some staff feeling there is a need to improve their jobs, satisfy their ego or to
reduce their emotional and financial insecurity.
WL and JA were two staff members, described by Justice Bellamy as
“individuals who lacked professionalism, ignored obvious conflicts of interest,
showed prodigious appetite for corporate freebies, and were incompetent and
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persistent liars. They were almost pathetically vulnerable to sales tactics in the
guise of entertainment and favours.”

WL and JA, in their position as decision

makers, had walked head first into corrupt activities and based on their actions
must have reasoned that what they were doing was not criminal.

So powerful

was WL, (a passionate advocate for TMACS or was it MS?) that she was able to
overturn the evaluator’s decisions to approve the new tax system as TXM 2000.
WL would continue to do whatever it took to extend the favours to TMACS. It did
not end there - ‘WL extended MS work proposals and placed him in charge of
implementing the proposed tax system TXM, likely to ensure its failure; she split
the contracts in two to give the impression that she was keeping within her
budget; she exceeded her signing limits for one of MS contracts and was a key
player in the TMACS victory’. “Bob Ripley’s memo to Giuliana Carbone said that
TXM was ‘a poor second choice’ compared with TMACS. When he wrote those
words, he didn’t believe them. He had surrendered. The events of the past year
had made it plain to him that WL would not be denied what she wanted, and she
clearly wanted TMACS”. (p. 80)

Added to WL wrongdoing, she also bribed

another senior manager by dangling the promise of a promotion in return for his
loyalty to TMACS. It was obvious that WL had taken her position, influence and
authority to another level. She was now involved in bribery, ‘which is the offering
of money, good or services in order to gain an unfair advantage.’ Her action was
used in an attempt to sway the senior manager’s opinion, action or decision. She
also abused or took advantage of her power, wherein she as the City Treasurer
used her authority to benefit dishonestly; That is, she extended favour towards
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MS in all the contracts including the TMACS tax system. With the continued
abuse of WL powers, she could also be said to be implicated in the act of
Patronage. This occurs ‘with the granting of favours, contracts or appointments
by a municipal staff in return for some form of support.’ Some politicians and
executives at the local level, by virtue of their position, are able to exercise their
influence and authority to control the key decision making process. “Dell bided
on a huge computer acquisition tendered by the City of Toronto but was knocked
out of the running. However, the company came back—seemingly from
nowhere—and won a big contract. Dell went on to provide the City of Toronto
millions of dollars’ worth of top-quality computers and excellent service, at a great
price. There was only one problem. Companies eliminated from competitive
tender processes are supposed to stay eliminated, not win contracts. When the
seemingly impossible happens, there may be invisible hands at work
somewhere… How was it transformed from out-of-the-running bidder to major
supplier?” (p. 117) The invisible hands appeared to have taken the form of JA
advising Dell to hire Jeff Lyons as their lobbyist, (who was also the lobbyist for
MFP) after which their favour with the city was noticeably improved. (p. 126).
This makes it clearer to determine that the ability to control decision making is
closely tied into ‘power’.

It is evident that from the associations that existed between WL, MS, JA, JL
and DD, that ‘corrupt activities occurs within human interactions for various
reasons and is not necessarily controlled by rules, regulations or policies.’ This
attests to Weber’s theory that “bureaucrats will develop interests of their own and
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start to shape policy, increasing the attendant danger that the rule of law will be
undermined…” (Raadschelders, 2008)
In the three months that DD had been placed on the City’s account, he had
submitted nearly $20,000.00 in entertainment expense receipts to MFP related to
City staff. DD receipts were questionable, because there were times when there
was no name or another MFP staff would have arbitrarily wrote a name in,
nonetheless his expenses were never questioned by his superiors. This manner
of business strategy was encouraged by DD’s superiors to ensure that MFP
continued to be in good standing with the City of Toronto.

Was the fact that

MFP always received the favour of the decision makers another unrecognized
sign of a weak system?

There was an obvious breakdown in communication

between IT, purchasing and Council, regarding the sale and lease back sale
program. This involved the City purchasing computers from Dell and then sold
the computers to MFP and leased them back from MFP. It was agreed that if
each party knew what was being done, the arrangements would have been
handled in a more accountable and transparent manner. That is, purchasing
would have approached the transaction differently through the required
competitive process if they knew exactly what the bid was for and it would have
required Council approval. (pp. 219-220) How could this lack of accountability
and transparency go unnoticed? The occurrence of these acts may have been
possible, as some elected officials and hired staff tends to get involved in corrupt
activities because a particular system that was put in place is not working as
planned.

A weak system in place is more likely to present opportunities for
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municipal employees to get involved in corrupt activities, especially if they believe
there is little to no chance that they will be caught.

In other words, corrupt

activities are to be expected where there is ‘lack of accountability and
transparency’ and ‘weak enforcement’.
It was alleged that Tom Jakobek, the Budget Chair and a veteran City
Councillor, accepted an all expense trip from DD to watch hockey in Philadelphia
and for what reasons? Would the acceptance of this gift have an effect on his
judgment in any future decisions relating to MFP? TJ and Jeff Lyons, the lobbyist
for both MFP and Dell Financial Services had known each other for over twenty
years. TJ showed interest in the tender process that involved both MFP and Dell
by requesting to see the draft RFQ. This revealed the fact that he had interest in
knowing where MFP stood in the tender process. JA later viewed forwarding the
information to TJ as an error of judgment. It was also alleged that JL announced
to DFS staff that “Tom, says it’s (the contract success) worth one hundred and
fifty grand”. Apparently JL wanted a ‘success fee’. He was taking advantage of
Dell’s precarious position to enrich himself, which suggested that another
troubling situation was in progress. Another allegation of corrupt activity was
said to have occurred between DD & TJ. It is alleged that DD withdrew funds,
made phone calls to and later met TJ in the parking garage of City Hall in a
matter of hours. Over the next two days large questionable deposits were made
to accounts of TJ and family. It is unclear what exactly took place between the
two, but due to what had been occurring at the City, there was much speculation.
(pp. 349-350)

But why would DD and TJ be involved in such an alleged
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transaction? “Councillor Jakobek’s motion at the Policy and Finance Committee
gave MFP great flexibility to enhance its deal with the City” (p. 374) and that was
DD’s job as the hunter to constantly ‘target his prey’. Justice Bellamy stated that
“Dash Domi and Tom Jakobek were given every opportunity to refute the theory
that a sales representative had made an improper payment to a City Councillor.
Their stories were inconsistent and implausible and they both seemed to forget
many critical details when it best suited their strategic purposes. The only thing
that was consistent was their lies”. (p. 375) Justice Bellamy also agreed that
there was enough credible evidence to reach a conclusion that there was a
payoff and no available proof to disprove the allegation. (p. 376)
Some hired staff and elected officials get involved in corrupt activities
because their municipalities operations may appear to promote corrupt activities,
known as ‘systemic corruption’. This corrupt activity takes the form of passing on
the culture to the new employees, who over time adopt the corrupt activity. It is
passed on at the executive level or by seasoned staff (directly or indirectly)
informing the newer staff that certain behaviours are acceptable and reinforcing
that, ‘that is how it is done here.’ Could this be the reason why MFP was usually
successful in winning their contracts with WL as one of the decision makers?
How could WL not notice the inaccuracies, such as photocopiers being included
with computers and referred to as peripherals in the submitted council reports
and including that fact that one awarded contract was not tendered? Is it likely
that it occurred because the other senior staff member who signed the report was
new and not yet familiar with the City process? (pp. 38-39, 218). “Kathryn Bulko
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followed the lead set by her superiors. She accepted invitations to corporate
boxes and vendor lunches. She played golf on corporate tabs and enjoyed
corporate hospitality suites. Echoing JA’s excuse, she said she saw this as part
of her job: ‘building relationships and networking’… she wasn’t aware there was
a code of conduct that governed her behavior” (p. 163)
When Councillor Balkissoon and the rest of council questions relating to the
multimillion dollar leases was made know to the public by John Barber in the
Globe and Mail, JL along with DD

attacked Councillor B accusing him of

seeking media attention. But was he really seeking media attention or was he
doing his job; seeking the best interest of the taxpayers and how their tax dollars
is been spent? Why would a lobbyist and a sales representative of MFP believe
that it was their duty to ‘attack’ a councillor as he carried out his duty? Is it likely
that they were made to believe that maintaining a ‘marketing relationship’ with
certain senior staff was acceptable and should not have been questioned by
anyone including councillors?

It is further believed that some municipalities

“contain a ‘subculture’ that resists legislation and regulation, and socializes new
employees in the skills and attitudes necessary to violate the law...” (Siegel,
2010).

Is this likely what was taking ‘flight’ within the City of Toronto

procurement process? On the contrary, Hirschi and Gottfredson argue that
‘corrupt activities by executives and staff are not a product of corporate culture
and that if it was so, there would be more corruption and the offenders would not
be offended when found out.’ (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1987) This view remain
arguable and will be revisited when I attempt to determine if the ‘distressing
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concerns’ have been lessened. Hirschi and Gottfredson further believe that ‘the
motives for corrupt activities are similar to the motives that lead to persons
committing other street crimes. That is, ‘the desire for quick and certain self
benefits with little effort…’
In short, the causes of the incidents and allegations of corruption that
occurred at the City of Toronto over time were largely as a result of bad
governance, lack of political goodwill, weak laws, lack of professional integrity
and lack of transparency and accountability. All the individuals involved (the
municipal staff, elected officials and the suppliers), their thoughts and the weak
system became corrupted and all these activities occurred within a process.
That is, the low values, wrong decisions, evil desires and wicked schemes, all led
to poor procedures, weak systems, bad conduct and inadequate regulations.
“Corruption also misdirects resources, an economic cost... It destroys the
confidence of people in their government and undermines the very legitimacy of
the political institution, the political costs.”

(Sampford & Preston, 2006).

“Corruption is a direct impediment to development as it hurts the many and

benefits the few. It inhibits the government’s ability to respond to citizens needs
and to utilize the scarce resources in the most efficient and effective manner.”
(Ongwenyi, 2008) This could be said of the activities of the elected officials and
senior staff of the City of Toronto who did not protect the interest of the City and
its citizens, when they failed to be trustees in ensuring that the tax dollars were
spent as efficiently as it could. They were in fact benefiting the few, themselves,
and hurting the many, the citizens of Toronto.
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THE MEASURES
“…Next it is the job of the public officials to assess the problem and its
causes and to respond as efficiently as possible through such means as
new legislative enactments…” (Pal, 2003)

Subsection 100 (2) of the Municipal Act “gives municipalities the authority
to establish a judicial inquiry to investigate ‘any matter connected with the good
government of the municipality or the conduct of any part of its public business’
and any related alleged misconduct.” This is a remarkable legislative tool in
terms of its objective in helping to address the incidents of corrupt activities, but
how many other municipalities take advantage of this tool when faced with
allegations? The City of Toronto took advantage of the authority given and
established an inquiry which was called the Toronto Computer leasing Inquiry or
‘TCLI’. However, the City Council eventually voted to broaden the coverage of
the inquiry to investigate and report on other contracts entered into by the City.
This second inquiry became known as the Toronto External Contracts Inquiry or
‘TECI’.
Along with the provision of section 100(2) of the Municipal Act,
municipalities also have the power to ‘demand’ the services of a judge of the
Superior Court and so Justice Bellamy was appointed to carry out a public inquiry
into the allegations. (p. 21) One may question why a public inquiry? As explain
by Justice Bellamy, “public inquiries (carried out in the eyes of the public) are
often convened in the wake of public shock, horror, disillusionment, or suspicion.
They are expected to uncover ‘the truth’. Inquiries are investigations, and in that
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sense they are informative and educational. They are also preventive, in that
they seek to ensure that any mistakes uncovered will not be repeated. Inquiries
also serve a purpose that is less obvious, but just as important they are
restorative.” (p. 20) This was another way to indicate to the tax paying public
that government was accountable and wanted to be transparent in how the issue
was handled, but most of all to show that they wanted to correct the problem and
prevent it from recurring.
As a part of the inquiry, Toronto City Council requested a comprehensive
review of the purchasing process within the city, one of the likely municipal
departments in which corrupt activities can occur. The objective was to assess
the procurement function to determine if the many procedures and policies that
were already in place were impartial, transparent and cost-effective.

It was

hoped that through the review, which included consulting with staff, conducting
surveys and reviewing documents and records, that the key successful factors
relating to the procurement process along with the problems and would be
highlighted and opportunities to improve them be identified. It took more than
three years to examine in minute detail the occurrences that had taken place at
City Hall. There were hearings from 156 witnesses which included members of
the media, Ontario MPP’s academics, private sector procurement experts,
lobbyist, federal ethics counsellor and citizen’s advocacy groups, all in an attempt
to assess the problem and its causes to facilitate an effective solution. (p. 90 &
93)
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It was clear that the City of Toronto wanted to do whatever it took to
evaluate the source of the problem, so before the public inquiry was established,
the services of a professional audit firm was retained to conduct an investigation.
The audit firm also concluded that a public inquiry was necessary and willing
assisted the inquiry by providing documents and notes where necessary.
Through the inquiry investigators were also hired to locate witnesses and
documents by conducting preliminary interviews. Also playing an important role
in the inquiry was experts who provided their professional knowledge and opinion
to facilitate a better understanding of what was taking place, why it was
happening and to suggest recommendations to prevent a recurrence.
The review and inquiry team established that there was a lack of clarity
with respect to roles and responsibilities within the procurement process. This
contributed to the unnecessary delays in the procurement of goods and services
and frustration among staff. Also highlighted was the fact that staff within the
department needed additional training. Training that would address the existing
questionable conditions such as ensuring integrity and compliance with policies
within the evaluation and decision making process.

It was brought to light that

some senior staff and councillors were unaware that codes were in place to
guide their behaviours and exposed the fact that the codes of conduct were not
effectively communicated.

The team also identified that the purchasing and

financial control bylaws and guidelines were not focused on operational decisions
in providing useful materials and guidance to staff and the appropriate controls
were not in place to minimize the risks and detect non-compliance within the
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process.

A review of the City policy with regards to external consultants also

revealed that there were no provisions to disallow them from participating in the
internal preparations of request documents. (pp. 965-969) The investigation
along with the evidence provided, highlighted the problem policy areas as
conflicts and ethics, lobbying, procurement and municipal governance.

In

respect to governance, Justice Bellamy gave her opinion that “Toronto City
Council meetings often resemble barely controlled chaos. An uncharitable
observer might even say they border on the chronically dysfunctional. [She]
observed that the root causes [were] interrelated and could not be ranked in any
definitive order of importance. (pp. 14-15)
During the hearings, Justice Bellamy encouraged the City to continue with
the necessary changes and to not simply await her recommendations. She was
pleased to see that the City did indeed begin implementing improvements, and
for her it meant that they had made an important headway. (p. 409) The City had
attempted to clarify the roles, responsibilities, authorities and accountability of the
PMM Division and the procurement process; they implemented new training
programs;

improved

management

controls;

improved

guidelines

for

communication with vendors and developed a checklist for the tender process.”
(p. 412) One of the corrective measures recommended before the inquiry was
conducted, was from the Audit Committee. It requested that the Auditor General
submit an annual report on the status of fraud and any related matter that
occurred within the City of Toronto. This was to be accomplished through the
information gathered from the Fraud and Waste hotline which was initiated in
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2002 and its operation became the responsibility of the Auditor General office.
The hotline facilitated whistle blowing another tool used to address corruption,
and it importance was highlighted through training of staff.
It was a matter of necessity that the inquiry be completed, because likely
resulting from the continued acts of corruption are ineffective controls,
unnecessary delays in processing, complicated procedures, and lack of
transparency and accountability. These corrupt activities at the City of Toronto, if
left unattended, were likely to lead to blatant disregard for standards and
integrity, inadequate audit and rampant oversights, some of which were already
unfolding as highlighted in Volume 1 – Facts and Findings of the Bellamy Report.
Having highlighted the problems and their causes, the next step is identifying the
preventative measures that were recommended and implemented in response to
the troubling condition or problem and their impact?
It

is

said

that,

“Law

and

court

decisions

affect

all

aspects

of

the…management process…Managers [and all staff members] must comply with
governmental regulations to promote an environment free from litigation.”
(Stewart, Belcourt, Bohlander, & Snell, HRM, 2011) This applies to all
organizations within society, with no exception for municipal management.
Justice Bellamy knew that there had to be effective measures to motivate
municipal staff and elected officials to conform to the rules in place and so
provided some 241 recommendations which were mostly directed towards the
procurement and tendering process and to Toronto City Council. This is not
surprising when we look back at the cause of the alleged corrupt activities and
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the persons involved. In the remaining part of this paper I will try to capture the
recommendations that best assist in answering the question of whether enough
is being done to eliminate corruption and maintain integrity within Ontario
municipalities.
The City of Toronto had been in the negative light of the public and media for
too long and their integrity was on the line.

They needed to ‘step up’ their

corrective measures and prepare themselves to consider and implement the
recommendations. In her recommendations, Justice Bellamy encouraged the
City and provincial officials to work together on any enabling legislation that
would be necessary to implement any of the recommendations” to address and
keep the danger of corrupt activities in check.

(p. 139)

In keeping with the

recommendations, one of the key amendments in the Municipal Act, 2001 was
the addition of Part V.1 – Accountability and Transparency, which is intended to
provide municipalities with greater accountability powers.

Municipalities are

given authority to create codes of conduct for hired staff and elected officials and
to put in place other measures such as the employment of an Integrity
Commissioner to ensure that corrupt activities are discouraged and integrity
maintained. This integrity commissioner would be a ‘watchdog’, overseeing the
performance of the elected officials and hired staff and “responsible for providing
advice, complaint resolution and education to members of City Council and
members of the local boards on the application of the City’s Code of Conduct and
other by-laws, policies and legislation governing ethical behavior.” (The City of
Toronto, 2009) The City needed to empower leadership that could outline and
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implement ‘visionary’ policy while continuing to be accountable. Part V.1 also
lists the unregulated authorities relating to the appointment of accountability
officers. These officers include: An Integrity Commissioner, Ombudsman, Auditor
General and a Lobbyist Registrar. It should be noted that only The New City of
Toronto Act mandates the appointment of all four offices with the City of Toronto.
All other municipalities can make their own decision about the establishment of
such. Is it prudent to suggest that this mandate to appoint all four offices be
reconsidered and expected of all Ontario municipalities?
Already in place was the Criminal Code and the Conflicts of Interest Act.
Sections 122 & 331-336 of the Criminal Code [R.S., c.C-34, S.1.] address corrupt
activities that can take place in municipal government operations. Section 122
specifically targets every public official who, in connection with the duties of his or
her office, commits fraud or a breach of trust. It speaks to staff actions that lead
to corruption such as theft, extortion, breach of trust, forgery and fraud. The
Municipal Conflicts of Interest Act R.S.O., 1990 c. M.50, presents rules regarding
conflicts of interest and enforces the rule via the Courts. The Act main purpose is
to prevent “public officials from benefiting financially from a decision in which they
are decision-makers. If a public official has a possible conflict of interest, they
must declare it, refrain from debating, voting on or in any way influencing the
decision and, if the meeting is closed to the public, they must leave the meeting
until the matter is no longer under consideration.”
To be able to fully determine if these laws are being effective or not, we need
to justify the purpose of government enacting legislation. There is justification in
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government enacting legislation, as “Government is a trust and the officers of the
government are trustees. Both the trust and the trustees are created for the
benefit of the people.” (Henry Clay). Laws were enacted with a special purpose
in mind, which is to promote transparency and accountability, to discourage
corruption and at the same time maintain integrity within government. Legislation
in general provides direction for staff and elected officials, to encourage them to
avoid in engaging in corrupt activities, such as giving or receiving of a bribe, and
falsifying a claim; to appreciate and reward hard work, honesty and
trustworthiness; to report cases of corruption to the relevant authorities; to
identify and eliminate situations that promote corruption and to suggest ways of
sealing loopholes that promote corruption and allows it to remain unreported or
unnoticed. In addition to providing directives for staff, it also encourages the
public to respect and protect public property and to name and shame corrupt
people.
Therefore, with these laws already in place, how could the activities have
played out at the City of Toronto without anyone recognizing they were engaging
in activities that were against the law? Richard and Susan Tindal in their 2007
article, ‘Keys to good governance’, stated that “if individuals within an
organization lacks the basic standards of moral and ethical behaviour, they will
devote their energies to finding ways around whatever new rules are put in
place.” (Tindal, 2007) This statement certainly poses a challenge to legislation
along with other preventative measures.

However, this is where Justice

Bellamy’s recommendation that the City appoints a full-time integrity or ethics
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commissioner could make the difference.

The integrity commissioner would

have investigative powers by requiring staff and councillors to co-operate with the
office of the integrity commissioner (rec. #43, 45), have an educational role with
respect to ethics and also an advisory role for councillors and staff (rec. #36 to
40, 49, 50)
The Ontario government having enacted legislation to direct municipal
operations in an attempt to reduce the allegations and occurrences of corruption
is realizing that something remains unresolved, as the reporting of incidents both
in the media and in the annual Auditor General’s report continue. Is it that the
laws are not effectively implemented? Is it that the prosecution for the crimes
committed is not persuasive enough? Or is there too much leniency within the
law through the judges and prosecutors for hired municipal staff and elected
officials when there is an allegation of their involvement in corruption? So what
else is needed and listed as a recommendation to curb or address the incidents
and allegations of corruption within local government and at the same time
maintain integrity?
With respects to codes of conduct, some of the recommendations by
Justice Bellamy suggested that the current codes of conduct be expanded for
councillors and conflicts of interest policy for staff to include ethical
considerations (rec. #1), and should reflect the difference in roles between
councillors and staff without setting different ethical standards (rec. #4). Codes
of conduct were also suggested for lobbyists (in an attempt to control or monitor
lobbying) where the City of Toronto was advised to set mandatory minimum
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standards for them as they conduct business with the City (rec. #98 to 104).
Justice Bellamy made it clear ‘that lobbying in itself was not inappropriate, but
served to provide public officials with useful information on goods and services’
(p. 411) In response to some of the activities that took place at the City of
Toronto, Greg Levine states that “offering a bribe is not lobbying, it is well beyond
it, it is corruption” (Levine, 2006) These recommendations were therefore
necessary to be used in addition to laws, as developing and implementing codes
of conduct and ethical standards was an additional step needed to assist with the
issue of corruption. Codes of conduct are crucial in protecting the employees
and the reputation of local government and are so designed to foresee and avert
unacceptable and corrupt behavior within municipal operations.

Codes often

capture a ‘vision of excellence’ and a guides employee along the preferred path
to achieve professionalism and the organization’s desired goals or objectives.
Codes are considered to be the “ultimate term of reference and the framework
upon which professions are built.” (Manyasi, 2008)

It is hoped that these codes

will keep staff and officials focused on doing what is right and for the right
reasons, and in so doing increase the likelihood that they will behave in an
acceptable manner on a consistent basis.
During the inquiry Justice Bellamy noted that the 2003 municipal elections
had passed and all of the major mayoral candidates in that election talked about
ethics, integrity, and restoring public trust. She went on to say that, ‘In 2003,
questions of ethics and integrity were given the prominence they needed, if the
residents of the City of Toronto are to have an accountable, transparent
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municipal government with integrity, one they deserve.’(p. 409)

Ken Otieno

Obura in a report to the USAID on anti-corruption and ethics, asserted that,
“promoting ethics and integrity in the fight to curb corruption is important as it is

the key to maintaining trust and determines the core values of a community”.
(Obura, 2008) Because ethics guidelines are extrinsic and integrity guidelines
are intrinsic, the success of the two in curbing corruption depends on the
personal commitment from individuals that make up the municipal staff.

Ethical

behaviours by municipal staff are displayed through the respect, fairness,
trustworthiness, accountability, self restraint and responsibility that are conveyed
during the administration of public resources. Integrity on the other hand, is an
‘internal system of principle’ which guides our behavior. That is, it is a choice
rather than an obligation, it cannot be forced by outside sources and it conveys a
sense of wholeness. Integrity involves the ability to discern right from wrong and
the commitment to do what is right all the time. Personal integrity also lays the
foundation for professional and institutional integrity. That is, staff will remain
committed to the goals and standards of their professions no matter the
circumstances.
The HRM functions which is “getting the most from employees for [the]
organizational success and providing a work environment that meets the
employee’…needs” (Stewart, Belcourt, Bohlander, & Snell, 2011) show that it
was designed to improve organizations performance and in so doing, is likely to
impede corruption. That is, it is in place to recruit the most competent staff
already with proper work ethics, promote positive relations between staff, provide
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the resources that are required for staff to work efficiently and effectively
including a positive and safe environment, ensure that practices and procedures
for municipal operation are in place to create a sense of accountability and
transparency, identify areas of weakness within the municipal operations and
design and impart knowledge through training programs to the elected officials
and line managers so that it can be passed on to staff. The focus of HRM is to
then emphasize the values that should be regarded, as staff carry out the daily
administration of the municipality. Since HRM is designed to effectively develop
it employees, it is equally important that it be incorporated within the municipal
corporate strategy to ensure the municipal goals are met through its staff.
(ASHOUR, 2004)

It

is

now

more

understandable

why

Justice

Bellamy

made

recommendations that involved having the HRM function assist in addressing the
problem.

Some of these recommendations were: that appropriate ethical

question be designed for use in interviews to assist in the hiring of the applicants
(rec. # 6) and that those new employees would receive immediate training on
ethics (rec. # 7). For all city staff and councillors, she suggested mandatory
training on codes of conduct (rec. # 8) and all should be required to sign an
annual declaration that they are aware of the codes of conduct, are versed in
them and will uphold them (rec. # 10).

In addition, Justice Bellamy

recommended that all the city codes of conduct be monitored to ensure that they
continue to provide appropriate guidance, and that the awareness of the codes
are promoted on an ongoing basis (rec. # 13, 14). Other recommendations that
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could be effectively implemented and carried out through the HRM function are
‘Relations between Councillors and staff’ (rec. # 15 to 19), ‘Conflicts of Interest
and Apparent conflicts of interest’ (rec. # 20 to 29), ‘Education and outreach’ (rec.
# 49, 50) and general training of staff (rec. # 136 to 145). It was noted that the
City of Toronto amended its existing conflicts of interest policy that required staff
to report and document all situations and in addition they were required to sign a
declaration indicating that they have read and understood the conflict of interest
policy.

Social accountability is a process that builds accountability and relies on
civic engagement, in which citizens and organizations can participate directly or
indirectly in raising and maintaining accountability. Social accountability includes
“citizen participation in public policy making, participatory budgeting, public
expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring of public service delivery, citizen advisory
boards, and lobbying and advocacy campaigns.”

(World Bank Group, 2011)

Justice Bellamy mentioned that an option to getting community councils involved
with the decision making is engaging them to act purely as a consultative body
on strategy and policy matters and also as final decision makers on issues of a
local nature, such as traffic issues. This is certainly engaging citizens but is it at
the level wherein they can assist in the prevention of corrupt activities? Justice
Bellamy supports her suggestion by stating that if community councils had the
powers to give directions to the administration it would create an untenable
situation for the Mayor and the Administration. (p. 22) With that in mind she was
sure to include as a recommendation that the public be allowed to make
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anonymous complaints to the integrity commissioner (rec. # 41) To further
support social accountability, Justice Bellamy recommended that the City through
the Mayor should report to the public on an annual basis (rec. # 96) One of these
annual report is the Auditors General’s report on the Fraud and Waste hotline. It
is hoped that through the provision of information such as this, the City is being
transparent and accountable and the public in response can choose to question
and initiate change where they see appropriate. Hazel McCallion, who is
currently facing allegations of corruption and is the longest serving mayor of the
City of Mississauga, one of Ontario largest municipality, states that “the sky is the
limit with the involvement of the people. Any decisions that politicians make, can
be controlled. Believe or not.” (McCallion, 2010)

In light of the troubling condition that was occurring over a number of
years at the City of Toronto, which started before the amalgamation, the City
ordered an investigation to assess the problem and it causes. The necessary
corrective actions were put in place, such as amending policies and after the
recommendations were provided, changes were implemented. It is unclear as to
the level of success that was achieved by the City in implementing the
recommendations, but a look at what happened during and after the inquiry
should give us a good idea of whether enough is being done to eliminate
corruption and maintain integrity within the municipality.
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THE OUTCOME
“…Attention continues until the distressing concern is alleviated.” (Pal,
2003)

The City of Toronto staff and officials had a good idea of the causes of the
problems and had started the remedial process. Justice Bellamy was pleased
that this was happening before she had completed the inquiry and presented her
recommendations.

However, as the inquiry drew to a close, a disturbing

situation unfolded.

Justice Bellamy gained knowledge of an invitation that

offered drinks, dinner and entry to a professional sporting event in an executive
suite at the Air Canada Centre that was sent to Toronto councillors all at the
expense of an industry association. (pg. 410) Receiving the invitation was not
the only issue, but the fact that some councillors defended the association for
sending the invitation and saw nothing wrong in attending the event raised
questions as to whether anything had really changed.

Councillors were not

seeing that they would be continuing the problems of: compromising their
independence in the eyes of the public; sending a message to other organization
that municipal officials and staff are still open to be influenced; using their public
office to obtain private benefits and setting a bad example for all other municipal
staff, when they should have been an ‘ethical compass’ in providing strong work
ethics. (pp. 410-411) The inquiry was not complete and already there were
strong indications that maybe the measures to address and eventually eliminate
corrupt activities from municipal operations were either not enough or just not
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getting through to officials and staff. After the inquiry, Justice Bellamy reported
that her task was now completed, and the City’s task of growth and renewal
should continue, as the task is never done. Her recommendations were made to
facilitate the City and its residents to re-examine the City’s governance and work
on continued improvements. (pp. 412-413) In November of 2009, the ‘Integrity
Commissioner of the City of Toronto organized a half-day conference with all the
other Ontario municipalities to discuss and exchange ideas on how to improve
the function of the integrity commissioner with the aim of providing more effective
services to Council and the Community.’ (Basse, 2010) This was another
indicator that government was working towards curbing corruption and
maintaining integrity within municipalities.

But how can we justifiably determine

if continued attention was given to address the issue with the objective to
alleviate the problem? This is where a credible database such as the Auditor
General annual report would be of value.
To help assess the effectiveness of the implemented preventative measures,
I will examine statistical data over the period 2002 through to 2010 that was
compiled by the City of Toronto’s Auditor General. (See Appendix 2) Alongside
the provision of the Municipal Conflicts of Interest Act, the Municipal Act and the
appointment of the four accountability officers, the City implemented a Fraud and
waste hotline in 2002.

In the 2010 annual Auditor General Report, a best

practice carried out by the City of Toronto, indicated that “the anonymous
reporting through the hotline is an effective means of detecting irregularities, as
the tips or complaints received remains the most common means of detecting
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fraud.” The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) a global
professional organization also confirmed that “the hotline remains an effective
fraud detection tool and encourages tips from employees who might otherwise
not report misconduct.” (Griffiths, Jeff, 2010) Over the years the data compiled
illustrated that the complaints steadily increased with slight decreases in the two
election years 2006 and 2010. The steady increase could be as a result of more
people feeling comfortable in making reports and / or the level of incidents wer
actually increasing.

The Auditor General expressed that it was unclear and

difficult to determine why the number of complaints fell by 15% in 2010 and that
the reasons could be as a result of varied factors. Could the decrease be as a
result of the effectiveness of the preventative measures that were implemented?
It must be noted that the complaints and allegations reported did not embody the
whole picture of corrupt activities at the City, but provided a good idea of what
was going on in order to determine what needed to be done and most importantly
that there were effective tools in place to help address alleged corrupt activities.
Measuring the negative effects of corruption is important as it causes the
municipality to see how much loss has been incurred and where it has occurred,
making way for the creation and implementation of effective recovery and
preventative measures. The far reaching effect of corruption can be seen in the
increased management costs where management is reallocated to conduct
investigations, reduced morale of staff leading to reduced productivity and a
flawed reputation of the municipality such as was the case with the City of
Toronto.

Measuring the costs can be difficult and not credible because the full
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details of every corrupt activity will not necessarily be revealed.

The City of

Toronto’s Auditor General Office has managed to capture data on Loss and
Recovery in 2010 (See Appendix 3). The data showed that of the complaints
received and were substantiated; quantifiable actual losses to the City were
$85,790.00, which is likely to increase as the 2010 complaints are concluded in
2011. The recovered amounts totaled $2,267 and are also expected to increase
as the complaints are concluded. Most importantly is the ‘At Risk’ amount of
$21,228.00. This represented potential loss to the City, had the incident of
wrongdoing continued without being detected. Having knowledge of the amounts
that were at risk, is substantial proof that the preventative measure is being
effective and is further enabling corrective actions to be taken. Despite the fact
that these numbers appear insignificant, the truth of the matter is that the
preventative measures implemented are working.

This kind of information is

what is needed to help substantiate the ongoing need for an effective anticorruption program and also provides evidence as to why compiling data on
corruption activities can be of great benefit to the prevention of corruption within
municipalities.

Based on the data provided by the Auditor General’s office on

alleged Fraud at the City of Toronto, it is evident that the distressing concern is
not completely alleviated, because the reporting continues.

Justice Bellamy

noted that “Eruptions of scandal involving public money show that our democratic
system is not perfect, but much can be done to mitigate the imperfections and
restore public trust”

(p. 8)
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Despite the various laws, regulations and codes, corrupt activities and
allegations of corrupt activities continue to be highlighted through the media and
reported through the fraud hotline. The question resurfaces, ‘Is government doing
enough through the preventative measures to meet the objective in curbing
corruption and promoting integrity within local government?’

The answer is

unfolding to an unquestionable ‘NO”. It is simple not enough - It is not enough
because as long as there are human interactions, humans will finds ways to get
around the measures.
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CONCLUSION

It is believed that upon being hired or elected to serve within a
municipality, all staff would rank integrity highly and uphold the virtues of
honesty, fairness, truthfulness and reliability as they serve. Unfortunately, for
varied reasons, and despite the intent and efforts of legislations, over time, there
are staff members who fail to comply and get drawn into corrupt activities. That is
to say, some politicians and executives at the local level, by virtue of their
position, are able to exercise their influence and authority to control the key
decision making process. This makes it clear that the ability to control decision
making is closely tied into ‘power’. It may be argued that elected officials do
have political power, but when that power is used in the wrong way, that is when
we have a problem. Therefore, it is because of this ‘power’ that they possess,
why municipalities must put in place policies and procedures that guides the
decision making process, and to ensure that these principles are adhered to on a
consistent basis, in the interest of accountability and transparency. I maintain
that the preventative measures currently in place are not enough to complete the
job of preventing and eliminating corruption and maintaining integrity within
municipalities. Because the human component plays a large role in municipal
operations and because of the inadequate preventative measures, we continue
to read and hear about allegations and incidents of corruption within
municipalities through the various media.
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Municipal staff, the general public, the police and the private sector can
make a difference in the level of corruption within municipalities. What is needed
is a clear understanding of the nature of corruption that takes place within
government and together they can work to curb its continuation. It must also be
understood that the corruption prevention issue cannot be left to the municipal
leaders alone. Pressure and collaboration from the staff, public, police and the
business community can and will keep the commitment of corruption prevention
alive. To be able to achieve this, citizens must be educated and informed about
the role they can play in fighting corruption within municipalities. They need to
understand that on-going corruption lowers their standard of living and that they
need to take a more active role in disclosing or reporting corrupt activities, by
monitoring or reviewing municipal government performance.
Legislators, municipal staff and residents alike are aware that, although
they are not directly involved in the corrupt activities that take place within
municipalities, they know that it will somehow have a negative effect on them. If
these incidents within municipal operations are allowed to continue, the integrity
status of the municipality and the competence of its staff is likely to be
questioned. The onlookers may not necessarily say that one or two municipal
staff members are being corrupt; they will say all city staffs and officials are
corrupt. This would reflect negatively on the HRM functions, the hired staff and
elected officials therein, which could lead to distrust between municipal staff
which could further lead to reduced performance and efficiency in service
delivery.

If the situation progresses to such a level, we can anticipate that the
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associated financial and economic problems will follow closely behind. It is the
government’s responsibility to address the issue of corruption by empowering
both the public and staff (by getting them more involved in the decision making)
to see how best corrupt activities within municipalities can be discouraged. So
what should be government’s additional approach to addressing corruption within
municipalities?
Mr. Pino Arlacchi at a global program against corruption conference pointed
out in his presentation that there are four positions in which actions can be taken
against corruption. (Arlacchi, 1999) I will only introduce two of the positions as it
relates to corruption prevention in Ontario.
“Firstly, government needs to put in place a solid set of preventative tools,
such as codes of conduct and strong independent bodies that can help ensure
that the standards of behaviours are respected.”
For codes of conduct and ethics to be at its best or most effective, it must be
developed in an organization that accepts and embraces its presence.

The

relevant authorities should bear in mind that these codes must be created, taking
into consideration the culture of the municipality. Communicating the details of
the code creation is also important so that staff are aware of why the codes are
being developed; understand the code itself, that is, what is expected and what is
not acceptable and the consequences if the codes are breached. This should
result in a more positive response from staff and for the codes to be more
effective in what it is trying to achieve. While it is arguable that codes do not
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necessarily work because they are unrealistic in their goals and give the
impression of being controlling, they can be most effective when created for the
administration and delivery of public services and when they are accompanied or
supported by legislation.
“Secondly, the public and staff alike need to be educated on the advantages
of good governance and participate in promoting it. The public must share the
responsibility in demanding honesty and integrity from their local government and
know that integrity is good and corruption is bad.”
Professor Ashour of Alexandria University, Egypt, in his report on Integrity,
Transparency

and

Accountability

in

Public

Sector

Human

Resources

Management, stated that once the HRM functions are effectively implemented it
will be easier to reinforce ethical and integrity principles (value-based) by
influencing or reshaping the corporate culture. The value based system coupled
with legislation (rule-based) would work to promote professionalism, efficiency,
integrity and fairness within local government, which in turn will overtime reduce
and discouraged wrongdoing, conflicts of interest and corruption. Integrity and
ethical behavior has to be established within municipal staff at the time of hire
because the municipality’s success will depend on the integrity of the municipal
staff.

‘It must be consistent in all municipal staff, it has to be a personal

commitment by all staff, it has to be fully endorsed by management, there has to
be a zero tolerance policy to assist in reducing the temptation to get involved in
corrupt activities and admonition, where all staff found guilty of being involved in
corrupt activity is appropriately dealt with as the legislation or regulations direct.’
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(Obura, 2008)

It is then evident that HRM can play an integral role in the

prevention and reduction of wrongdoing, conflicts of interest and corruption
allegations and at the same time uphold integrity within municipalities.
Social accountability from municipalities (the supply side) is achieved through
the processes and procedures, regulations & codes of conduct in place, annual
financial audits and through the directives of the upper levels of government.
Social accountability is achieved through the involvement of the public (the
demand side) when local government encourages their participation in budget
making, include them in evaluating service delivery, providing education on their
legal rights and about the services they are entitled to and facilitate the
involvement of the citizens advisory board or community councils. “Municipalities
are increasingly understood to be not just service providers but democratic
governments. This reconceptualization highlights the imperative of operating in a
democratic, accountable and transparent manner and brings with it expectations
that governments engage citizens and communities in meaningful ways in the
policy process.” (Good, 2009)
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RECOMMENDATIONS
We are aware that rule based preventative measures such as laws, codes
of conduct and policies are in place to address corruption and maintain integrity
within Ontario municipalities. It is also recognized that they alone are not enough
to achieve the task. Best practices that are successful used by municipalities
such as the Fraud hotline used by the City of Toronto should be shared and its
use encouraged by other municipalities. But what else can be acted upon by
government to address and eventually eliminate corruption and maintain integrity
within Ontario municipalities?
An “Anti-corruption strategy must be articulated by leaders in the political,
economic and civil society; it must engage all sectors…” (Ongwenyi, 2008) This
strategic program objective is to empower staff and public alike through
knowledge which will in turn compel government to be more accountable and
transparent in the delivering of services and administering the daily municipal
operations.

This program facilitates the building of awareness of both the

municipal staffs and the public, the prevention of the corrupt activities by staff,
the prosecution of the corrupt municipal staff and rewarding the loyal public
servant. Empowerment of the public and staff through the program along with the
rule of law together makes a great preventative tool in curbing corruption at the
municipal level.
It is without question that local government and government in general needs
to be reformed as it relates to HRM role. It is confirmed that not only can HRM
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play a direct and effective role, but it should play an integral role in the prevention
and reduction of wrongdoing, conflicts of interest and corruption allegations and
at the same time uphold integrity within municipalities. Since it is evident that the
amount of these incidents are more likely to occur once the human factor is
involved, the more reasons why HRM should be incorporated to reinforce
integrity, transparency and accountability, with the intention to eventually
eliminate corrupt activities.

It must be recognized that if the integrity of the

individual is not solidified, once the opportunity presents itself through a weak
system or receiving of authority or influence, the individual is more likely to get
involved. If the individual knows what is expected of him/her, they will more than
likely do the right thing.
Rick Brick established that Human Resource Management is more than
“hiring” and “firing.” He believes organizations should find a way to integrate all
aspects of HR within their operational plans and one that is has the full support of
its executive, leaders, staff members and unions.

In short, Brick asserts that

HRM is a key strategic component of any organization including the public sector
and can bring high value through innovative programs by working closely with the
organization leadership to advance its goals. (Brick, 2011) In this case, the goal
is to eventually eliminate corrupt activities and maintain integrity within
municipalities.
Prof. Ahmed Ashour proposed a framework for strengthening integrity,
transparency and accountability through HRM. (ASHOUR, 2004) He suggested
‘To prevent corruption, is to ensure that ethical practices are carried out by HR
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specialist and line managers, to be able to achieve a high level of integrity in the
decision making process. He also suggested that support be provided to the
municipality ethics reform, through policies and practices that aim at influencing
human performance and conduct in local government.’ He goes on to say that,
‘morale, commitment, loyalty, motivation and competence are dimensions that
impacts ethics and integrity, which are the results of HR policies and practices.
The Municipal Performance Measurement Program (MPMP) with its reliable
and credible measurement and reporting system that provides high-level
information should use its position and resources to create a database of all
incidents of corruption within Ontario municipalities. The information from all the
municipalities should include dates, type of incident or allegations, identify
whether the individual involved is an employee or elected official, how the
incident was made public, identifying the weakness in the system that
encouraged its occurrence and how the incident or allegation was resolved. The
data collected on municipal corruption should include measurements wherein the
perceived increase could be validated and used in a creative and constructive
way to increase awareness on the issue and highlight best practices to
discourage and prevent future corruption:

All in an attempt to facilitate

accountability, transparency and integrity to further enhance the performance of
Ontario municipalities.
In closing, Justice Bellamy stated that “If those lessons are learned by people
in government, and by people dealing with government, we can hope to see
scandals (corrupt activities) arising from spending public money far less
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frequently.” (p. 24) Therefore, let municipalities learn the lessons and adopt the
best practices so that it can be confidently said that government is doing enough
to address and eliminate corruption and preserve integrity within Ontario
municipalities.
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APPENDIX

Figure # 1
Primary Motivation of Serious Fraud Offenders
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Figure # 2
Complaints reported at the City of Toronto 2002 to 2010
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Figure # 3
Loss and Recovery in 2010 – The City of Toronto
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